

# 4L Week 7 Instructional Book

*-You do **NOT** turn this in. Please only return the "Workbook" packet with the checklist on it.*

#### 4L Art (Read me):

Over the last few weeks we have practiced how to draw the human form in proportion. First, I had you lay out the bones of a proportional stick skeleton, then add thickness or muscle to that skeleton, and eventually turn it into a person or a mannequin. This week I want you to expand on what you have learned and draw the human form in a pose or a gesture. Below there are four gesture drawing options. Pick one to draw and follow the steps to make your own gesture drawing. (Remember, all art assignments have a video to go with them and you can find them in the distance learning section of the [parnasusteachers.com](http://parnasusteachers.com) website with password Pegasus.)

**A-The Kicker**




**B- The Conqueror**



**C- The Runner**




**D-The Lifter.**




**Step 1:** The first step, just like the previous assignments, is to break the image into simple shapes. Since we are drawing the human form, sketch out the “Stick Skeleton” first. Remember to draw lightly in the first steps since we will erase some of this later. Also, don’t forget to draw circles for your joints like I have done in the examples below.

**A-The Kicker**




**B- The Conqueror**



**C- The Runner**



**D-The Lifter.**




**Step 2 :** Now that you have your lightly drawn stick skeleton you can start to add thickness or muscle to the body. Start by drawing thin oval shapes from the circle joints of each shoulder. Draw the same oval shape from the shoulder joint circle to the elbow joint circle, and so on. Continue this until you have outlined your skeleton, like I have done below. Don't forget, we are still drawing lightly in this step, as these shapes will serve as a guide as you continue with your drawing. Once you have the muscles drawn, it is time to erase the stick skeleton and start adding your details. Move on to Step 3a or Step 3b.


**A-The Kicker**



**B- The Conqueror**



**C- The Runner**



**D-The Lifter.**



**Step 3a:** If you are not drawing a sentient being continue to Step 3b.

If you are not drawing a sentient being continue to Step 3b. In this step you will draw in your character's face using the face map method and add whatever details you would like. This is your chance to really get creative! You can draw your character as a Spartan Warrior, a Viking, a Greek/Roman God, anyone from history, or even yourself! Once you are done adding the defining details to your character, erase any muscle lines that do not need to be seen anymore.

**A-The Kicker**



**B- The Conqueror**



**C- The Runner**




**D-The Lifter.**




**Step 3b:** In this step you will draw in the remaining parts of the mannequin image you have selected. Once you are done adding the defining details to your mannequin erase any lines that do not need to be seen anymore. Make sure to add in any shadows you may see in the drawing, after that you are done.


**A-The Kicker**




**B- The Conqueror**



**C- The Runner**



**D-The Lifter.**



# The Indian Nationalist Movement

## I. Indian Nationalism Grows

*How do nationalist feelings increase on the Indian peninsula?*

Many Indians grew angry at British domination of Indian life. Indian nationalism had been growing since the mid-1800s. Some Indians joined the Indian political parties like the **Indian National Congress (I.N.C.)** or the **Muslim League**. These were two groups that worked toward independence.

More than one million Indians served in the British army in World War I. The British promised to make changes to the government of India once the war was over. These changes would give the Indian people greater self-determination (control of their own nation). After the war, though, returning Indian soldiers were once again treated as second-class citizens. Reforms were not made.

As tension began to increase, the British Parliament passed laws to limit Indian's freedom to assemble that allowed protesters to be jailed without a trial. Western-educated Indians believed this to be a violation of their rights. About 10,000 Indians gathered at the city of Amritsar to protest this act in the spring of 1919. The new British laws had banned such public meetings, but the crowd was mostly unaware of that fact. British troops fired on the crowd. Several hundred protesters were killed. The event became infamous as **The Amritsar Massacre** and sparked further protests across India. The British responded by arresting the leaders of the I.N.C. including Mohandas Gandhi for inciting the protests. Almost overnight millions of Indians changed from loyal British subjects to revolutionaries and nationalists.

1. Describe at least 2 reasons many Indians to turn against British rule?

### TERMS AND NAMES

**Indian National Congress** Largely Hindu Nationalist group led by Jawaharlal Nehru

**The Muslim League** Muslim Nationalist group that desires a separate Indian nation for Muslims


**The Amritsar Massacre** 1919 event in which British soldiers fire into a peaceful crowd of Indian protestors

**Mohandas K. Gandhi** Key figure in the movement for Indian independence from Britain

**Civil disobedience** Disobeying the law for the purpose of achieving some higher goal

**Salt March** A march to the sea to protest British salt tax

**Jawaharlal Nehru** Popular leader of the Indian Congress who becomes India's first Prime Minister




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## II. Mahatma Gandhi


### *How does Gandhi use non-violent methods to gain Indian independence?*

A former lawyer, Mohandas K. Gandhi rose to become the leader of India's protest movement. He had attended law school in England and practiced law in South Africa. He had a deeply religious approach to political activity. His teachings contained ideas from all of the major religions of the world, including Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity. The Indian people began to call him India's "Great Soul," or *Mahatma*.



Mohandas Gandhi had become active in the movement for Indian self-rule before World War I. He began to organize mass protests to achieve his goals. He believed in **nonviolence** and protested British laws by using the methods of **civil disobedience** (refusal to obey laws considered to be unjust). In 1919, Gandhi was arrested for his role in the protests and spent several years in prison.

When Gandhi was released from prison he immediately returned to his struggle for Indian independence. Nonviolence was still at the center of his policy and his actions were based on complete noncooperation with the British or **passive resistance**. He asked Indians to stop buying British goods, attending British schools, paying British taxes, or voting in British-run elections. He also persuaded his followers to take these actions while not using violence. British jails filled with thousands of Indians who broke British laws in order to protest them.



Next Gandhi led a protest against a mercantilist British law that forced them to buy salt only from the government. Britain had increased the tax on salt while prohibiting the Indian people from manufacturing or harvesting their own salt. In 1930, Gandhi and his supporters walked to the sea. This became known as the **Salt March**. When they reached the coast after month of walking, Gandhi began to gather up India's plentiful natural sea salt. Thousands of Indians did the same thing. Gandhi and many other members of the INC were arrested for violating the Salt Tax.

2. Describe 3 ways Gandhi and his followers resist British rule non-violently.


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### III. The Partitioning of India

*How does religious conflict lead to separate nations on the Indian peninsula?*

The Salt March inspired even more protests and acts of civil disobedience throughout India, even as many Indian National Congress leaders sat in British jails. In 1935, the British finally gave in. They passed a law that allowed local Indian self-government. While this granted some self-determination over local matters, the law fell far short of granting India independence. And as Great Britain became preoccupied by the troubling events taking place in Europe, some of the people of India grew impatient and looked for new leadership.

In the 1930s, **Jawaharlal Nehru** emerged as a new leader in the Indian independence movement. He was a very different kind of Indian politician than Gandhi. He had also studied law in Great Britain, but he was upper class and intellectual. The independence movement now split into two paths. Gandhi's movement was religious and traditional. Nehru's movement was secular and modern. The two leaders worked together for their common goal of independence, but were also rivals at times.



However India's Muslim minority did not identify with either of the major nationalist groups. Hostility between Muslims and Hindus greatly increased in India as British rule begins to come to an end. Muslims were dissatisfied with the I.N.C. because Hindus dominated it. They also did not trust the upper caste, intellectual Nehru. By the 1930s, the Muslim League was starting to believe in the creation of a **separate Muslim state of Pakistan** in the northwest part of the country. Representatives of the League claimed that Muslim Indians would not be secure in a Hindu dominated India. By the end of World War II, the leaders in Great Britain became convinced. Once independent, India would not be able to remain one united nation as Nationalist like Gandhi had hoped. The subcontinent would have to be partitioned into two countries, one Hindu (India) and one Muslim (Pakistan).



3. Why was India divided into two countries?



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4. What two nations will be created?

#### IV. The new Nations of India & Pakistan

##### *How does religious conflict lead to violence and assassination?*

The hard fought goal of independence was finally achieved when Parliament issued the Indian Independence Act in July 1947. A month later the sovereign nations of India & Pakistan are formally recognized. Pakistan consisted of two regions (East & West) separated by India. One part, West Pakistan, was to the northwest of India. The other, East Pakistan, was to the northeast. Millions of Muslim Indians now found themselves in a Hindu nation, and millions of Hindu Indians now found themselves in a Muslim nation. These Indians now found themselves faced with a difficult decision of whether or not to migrate from their homes.



Many did make the choice to leave for a new nation if it meant greater safety and security. But the journey to get to get that new nation was anything but safe. Millions of Hindus and Muslims fled across the new borders—Hindus to India and Muslims to the two Pakistan's. In the weeks of chaos violence broke out, and more than a million people were killed. British, Indian, & Pakistani leaders tried to stop the riots. Gandhi began a hunger strike to until the violence stopped, it will be his last act of protest. Mohandas Gandhi, is assassinated by a Hindu militant on January 30, 1948 as he celebrating as his hunger strike came to an end. With Gandhi's tragic death, Jawaharlal Nehru becomes the obvious choice to become India's first Prime Minister.

Since the original partition in 1947 other new nations have won independence from what was British India. These nations include Myanmar (Burma), Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. When Pakistan was first formed, it had east and west parts that were separated by India. In a bloody fight in 1971, the eastern part won its independence. The new nation in the Bengal region of India took the name Bangladesh. Ceylon, an island on the southeastern coast of India, won its independence in 1947 as well. In 1972 it was renamed Sri Lanka. While nationhood and self-determination has been a positive step, ethnic & religious violence remains a constant threat to peace in all of the new nations of for the Indian sub-continent.

5. What happens to Mohandas Gandhi? Who becomes India's 1<sup>st</sup> Prime Minister?


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6. What other nations are created out of British India in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century?

## V. Religious & Ethnic Violence plagues the Indian Subcontinent

### *How have India and Pakistan been affected by Religious Conflict?*

Almost immediately following independence India's Prime Minister **Jawaharlal Nehru** found himself in a state of war over the contested region of Kashmir in Northern India. Kashmir had a Hindu ruler, but a large Muslim population that felt closer ties to neighboring Pakistan than the Hindu nation of India. Conflict over Kashmir continues today and periodically erupts into street riots and religious violence.



Nehru's main goals as the 1<sup>st</sup> prime minister focused on reforming Indian society. He hoped to improve the status of Indians who had traditionally faced discrimination such as the lower *castes* and women. Shortly after he died in 1964, his daughter, **Indira Gandhi**, became prime minister. She took steps to increase food production. In 1984, she ordered an attack on Sikh rebels. A few months later, she was killed by Sikhs. She was followed by her son Rajiv Gandhi. He was later assassinated by a Tamilese nationalist group who were fighting to break free from Sri Lanka. *Separatist movements* continue to *disrupt* Indian society.

Pakistan has faced a great deal of violence, too. When Pakistan was first formed, it had east and west parts that were separated by India. In a bloody fight in 1971, the eastern part won its independence. The new nation took the name Bangladesh. Power struggles have caused problems in the western part since then. Its leaders have included Ali Bhutto and his daughter, **Benazir Bhutto**. She was elected prime minister twice in the 1980's and 90's. Because of her gender and her secular beliefs Benazir Bhutto was assassinated while running for election a third time in 2007. The Islamic terrorist group Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for carrying out the suicide bombing.



### 7. Why does conflict continue in Kashmir?

Please write answer in  
the workbook

8. Name at least 3 leaders of the nations of India and Pakistan that have been assassinated in the last 40 years.

## TEACHER REFERENCE DOCUMENT:

### A Short Summary of the Vietnam War

#### Imperialism and Colonialism

The Vietnam War has roots in Vietnam's centuries of domination by imperial and colonial powers—first China, which ruled ancient Vietnam, and then France, which took control of Vietnam in the late 1800s and established **French Indochina**. In the early 1900s, nationalist movements emerged in Vietnam, demanding more self-governance and less French influence. The most prominent of these was led by Communist leader **Ho Chi Minh**, who founded a militant nationalist organization called the **Viet Minh**.



#### The First Indochina War

During World War II, when France was occupied by Nazi Germany, it lost its foothold in Vietnam, and Japan took control of the country. The Viet Minh resisted these Japanese oppressors and extended its power base throughout Vietnam. When Japan surrendered at the end of World War II in 1945, Ho Chi Minh's forces took the capital of **Hanoi** and declared Vietnam to be an independent country, the **Democratic Republic of Vietnam**.



Ho Chi Minh

France refused to recognize Ho's declaration and returned to Vietnam, driving Ho's Communist forces into northern Vietnam. Ho appealed for aid from the United States, but because the United States was embroiled in the escalating Cold War with the Communist USSR, it distrusted Ho's Communist leanings and aided the French instead. Fighting between Ho's forces and the French continued in this First Indochina War until 1954, when a humiliating defeat at **Dien Bien Phu** prompted France to seek a peace settlement.

#### Divided Vietnam

The **Geneva Accords** of 1954 declared a cease-fire and divided Vietnam officially into **North Vietnam** (under Ho and his Communist forces) and **South Vietnam** (under a French-backed emperor). The dividing line was set at the 17th parallel and was surrounded by a demilitarized zone, or DMZ. The Geneva Accords stipulated that the divide was temporary and that Vietnam was to be reunified under free elections to be held in 1956.

#### The Cold War and the Domino Theory

At this point, the United States' Cold War foreign policy began to play a major part in Vietnam. U.S. policy at the time was dominated by the **domino theory**, which believed that the "fall" of North Vietnam to Communism might trigger all of Southeast Asia to fall, setting off a sort of Communist chain reaction. Within a year of the Geneva Accords, the United States therefore began to offer support to the anti-Communist politician **Ngo Dinh Diem**. With U.S. assistance, Diem took control of the South Vietnamese government in 1955 and declared the Republic of Vietnam. Due to the popularity of Ho Chi Minh throughout Vietnam, Diem promptly canceled the elections that had been scheduled for 1956.



Self-Immolation

#### The Diem Regime

Diem's regime proved corrupt, oppressive, and extremely unpopular. He was so unpopular that some Buddhist monks protested his regime using **self-immolation** – setting oneself on fire. Nonetheless, the United States continued to prop Diem up, fearful of the increasing Communist resistance activity in South Vietnam.




This resistance against Diem's regime was organized by the Ho Chi Minh-backed **National Liberation Front**, which became more commonly known as the **Viet Cong**.

In 1962, U.S. president John F. Kennedy sent American "military advisors" to Vietnam to help train the South Vietnamese army, the ARVN, but quickly realized that the Diem regime was unsalvageable. Therefore, in 1963, the United States backed a coup that overthrew Diem and installed a new leader. The new U.S.-backed leaders proved just as corrupt and ineffective.

#### Johnson and U.S. Escalation

Kennedy's successor, **Lyndon B. Johnson**, pledged to honor Kennedy's commitments but hoped to keep U.S. involvement in Vietnam to a minimum. He kept Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, **Robert McNamara**, but

replaced the previous American military commander with **William C. Westmoreland** – a U.S. general who advocated aggressive strategies against Viet Cong and NVA using large numbers of U.S. forces. After North Vietnamese forces allegedly attacked U.S. Navy ships during the **Gulf of Tonkin Incident** in 1964, Johnson was given carte blanche in the form of the **Gulf of Tonkin Resolution**. This resolution allowed Johnson “to take all necessary measure to repel any armed attack against the forces of United States and to prevent further aggression;” this greatly expanded his presidential power. With the free hand recently provided by Congress, Johnson ordered the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy to begin an intense series of air strikes called **Operation Rolling Thunder**. He hoped that the bombing campaign would demonstrate to the South Vietnamese the U.S. commitment to their cause and its resolve to halt the spread of Communism. Ironically, the air raids seemed only to increase the number of Viet Cong and NVA (North Vietnamese Army) attacks. Johnson’s “Americanization” of the war led to a presence of nearly 400,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam by the end of 1966.



Vietnam takes its toll on President Johnson

### Quagmire and Attrition

In 1965, Westmoreland began to implement a **search-and-destroy** strategy that sent U.S. troops out into the field to find and kill Viet Cong members. Westmoreland was confident that American technology would succeed in slowly wearing down the Viet Cong through a war of **attrition**—a strategy of extended combat meant to inflict so many casualties on the enemy that it could no longer continue. U.S. leaders agreed, believing that North Vietnam’s economy could not sustain a prolonged war effort.

In light of this new strategy of fighting a war of attrition, U.S. commanders were instructed to begin keeping body counts of enemy soldiers killed. Although body counts were indeed tallied, they were often exaggerated and proved wildly inaccurate, as the bodies of Viet Cong soldiers often were difficult to distinguish from the bodies of friendly South Vietnamese soldiers.

However, the Viet Cong’s guerrilla tactics frustrated and demoralized U.S. troops, while its dispersed, largely rural presence left American bomber planes with few targets. The United States therefore used unconventional weapons such as **napalm** – a highly flammable jellied substance -- and the herbicide defoliant **Agent Orange** but still managed to make little headway.

### The Ho Chi Minh Trail

Meanwhile, U.S. forces continued to try to cut off Viet Cong supply lines through air power. These efforts expended a great deal of time and resources, but the North Vietnamese government proved extremely savvy in its ability to keep the Viet Cong supplied. Rather than attempt to send materials across the heavily guarded DMZ (the demilitarized zone surrounding the border between North and South Vietnam at the 17th parallel), they sent supplies via the **Ho Chi Minh Trail**, which ran from North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam (see map above). Troops and supplies streamed into South Vietnam via the trail and despite intense U.S. bombing throughout 1965, the trail never closed once, not even temporarily.



“General Nguyen Ngoc Loan executing a Viet Cong prisoner in Saigon”  
Famous Tet Offensive

### The “Credibility Gap”

Despite the numerous setbacks, Johnson and other U.S. officials, citing increased troop numbers and redefined objectives, again claimed to be making headway in the war. Many government officials reported that the North Vietnamese were declining in strength and were on the brink of defeat. Photos and video footage of dead American soldiers in newspapers and on evening news programs, however, indicated otherwise. Moreover, U.S. spending in support of the war had reached record levels, costing the government an estimated \$3 billion a month. As a result, many people in the United States began to speak of a **“credibility gap”** between what Johnson and the U.S. government was telling the American people and what actually was transpiring on the ground.



### The Tet Offensive

In 1968, the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong launched a massive campaign called the **Tet Offensive**, attacking nearly thirty U.S. targets and dozens of other cities in South Vietnam at once. Although the United States pushed back the offensive and won a tactical victory, American media coverage characterized the conflict as a defeat, and U.S. public support for the war plummeted. Morale among U.S.

troops also hit an all-time low, manifesting itself tragically in the 1968 **My Lai Massacre**, in which frustrated U.S. soldiers killed hundreds of unarmed Vietnamese civilians in a small village.

### The Antiwar Movement

Meanwhile, the antiwar movement within the United States gained momentum as student protesters, countercultural hippies, and even many mainstream Americans denounced the war. Protests against the war and the **selective service system** -- military draft -- grew increasingly violent, resulting in police brutality outside the **Democratic National Convention** in 1968 and the deaths of four students at **Kent State University** in 1970 when Ohio National Guardsmen fired on a crowd. Despite the protests, Johnson's successor elected in 1968, President Richard M. Nixon, declared that a "silent majority" of Americans still supported the war.

### **Vietnamization and U.S. Withdrawal**

Nonetheless, Nixon promoted a policy of **Vietnamization** of the war, promising to withdraw U.S. troops gradually and hand over management of the war effort to the South Vietnamese. Although Nixon made good on his promise, he also illegally expanded the geographic scope of the war by authorizing the bombing of Viet Cong sites in the neutral nations of **Cambodia** and **Laos**, all without the knowledge or consent of the U.S. Congress. The revelation of these illegal actions, along with the publication of the secret **Pentagon Papers** in US newspapers in 1971, caused an enormous scandal in the United States and forced Nixon to push for a peace settlement. These papers revealed that the U.S. Army, as well as presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, had authorized a number of covert actions that increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam unbeknownst to the American public. The government tried to block the publication of these papers under the guise of "national security", but the Supreme Court ruled in **New York Times v. US** that the government must prove an immediate threat to national security to censor the papers.

### **Congress's Response**

Outraged by the unauthorized invasion of Cambodia and by the double scandal from the My Lai Massacre and the



Nixon and Kissinger

Pentagon Papers, many in Congress took steps to exert more control over the war and to appease the equally angry public. The Senate voted to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to reduce the military's unchecked spending power (although the House of Representatives did not follow suit). Congress also reduced the number of years drafted soldiers needed to serve in the army. Finally, the **Twenty-Sixth Amendment** was ratified in 1971 to lower the U.S. voting age from twenty-one to eighteen, on the grounds that the young men serving in Vietnam should have a say in which politicians were running the war.

### **The War Powers Resolution**

In July 1973, Congress and the American public learned the full extent of the secret U.S. military campaigns in Cambodia. Testimony in congressional hearings revealed that Nixon and the military had been secretly bombing Cambodia heavily since 1969, even though the president and Joint Chiefs of Staff had repeatedly denied the charge. When the news broke, Nixon switched tactics and began bombing Cambodia openly despite extreme public disapproval.

Angry, Congress mustered enough votes to pass the November 1973 **War Powers Resolution** over Nixon's veto. The resolution restricted presidential powers during wartime by requiring the president to notify Congress upon launching any U.S. military action abroad. If Congress did not approve of the action, it would have to conclude within sixty to ninety days. In effect, this act made the president accountable to Congress for his actions abroad. Congress also ended the draft in 1973 and stipulated that the military henceforth consist solely of paid volunteers. Both the War Powers Resolution and the conversion to an all-volunteer army helped quiet antiwar protesters.

### **The Cease-fire and the Fall of Saigon**

After secret negotiations between U.S. emissary **Henry A. Kissinger** and North Vietnamese representative **Le Duc Tho** in 1972, Nixon engaged in diplomatic maneuvering with China and the USSR—and stepped up bombing of North Vietnam—to pressure the North Vietnamese into a settlement. The **Paris Peace Accords** were finally signed in January 1973, and the last U.S. military personnel left Vietnam in March 1973.

Under the terms of the agreement, Nixon pledged to **withdraw** all remaining military personnel from Vietnam and allow the tens of thousands of NVA troops in South Vietnam to remain there, despite the fact that they controlled a quarter of South Vietnamese territory. However, Nixon promised to intervene if North Vietnam moved against the South. In exchange, North Vietnam promised that **elections** would be held to determine the fate of the entire country. Although Nixon insisted that the agreement brought "**peace with honor**," South Vietnamese leaders complained that the terms amounted to little more than a surrender for South Vietnam.

The U.S. government continued to fund the South Vietnamese army, but this funding quickly dwindled. Meanwhile, as President Nixon became embroiled in the **Watergate scandal** that led to his resignation in August 1974, North Vietnamese forces stepped up their attacks on the South and finally launched an all-out offensive in the spring of 1975. On April 30, 1975, the South Vietnamese capital of **Saigon** fell to the North Vietnamese, who reunited the country under Communist rule as the **Socialist Republic of Vietnam**, ending the Vietnam War.

Adapted and Edited by the Carolina K-12

Sources:

<http://www.sparknotes.com/history/american/vietnamwar/summary.html>  
<http://www.vn-tours.com/images/tour/map/vietnam-asia-map.gif>  
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[http://www.bristol.ac.uk/Depts/History/Sixties/Feminism/1968\\_files/image001.gif](http://www.bristol.ac.uk/Depts/History/Sixties/Feminism/1968_files/image001.gif)  
<http://www.uiowa.edu/~policult/assets/VietNam/KentState.jpg>  
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1

## Independence Movement in Vietnam



- In 1940 the Japanese invaded Vietnam.
- They were among many foreigners who had ruled over the Vietnamese.
- From the late 1800's till after WWII the French had ruled Vietnam.
- The Vietnamese did not want to be ruled by foreigners and by the 1900s, nationalism had become a powerful force in the country.
- One of the leaders of the nationalist movement for almost 30 years was Nguyen Tat Thanh – better known by his assumed name, Ho Chi Minh.

2


## Communist Party

- At the age of 21, Ho Chi Minh traveled to Europe where he lived in London and then Paris.
- In 1919 he presented a petition for Vietnamese independence at Versailles Peace Conference, but the issue was ignored.
- He then made a visit to the Soviet Union and became an advocate for communism.
- In 1930 he returned to Southeast Asia and helped found the Indochinese Communist Party and worked to overthrow the French.



3

## The U.S. Send Help



- Ho Chi Minh's activities made him a wanted man.
- He fled Indochina and spent several years in exile in the Soviet Union and China.
- In 1941 the Japanese had taken control of the country
- Ho Chi Minh organized a nationalist group called the **Vietminh**.
- The group united communists and non-communists in the struggle to expel the Japanese.
- Soon after the U.S. began sending aid to the Vietminh.

4

## Rock and a Hard Place

- After WWII Japan gave up control of Vietnam.
- Ho Chi Minh declared independence but the French returned to Vietnam in 1946 and drove the Vietminh forces into hiding.
- The Vietminh fought back against the French so the French asked the U.S. for help.
- The U.S. was in a difficult position
- They did not approve of colonialism but they also did not approve of communism.
- Two events helped convince President Truman to help France
  - The fall of china to Communism
  - They outbreak of the Korean War.
    - (Domino Theory)



5

## Dien Bien Phy




- The French were having little success against the Vietminh and their guerrilla tactics (irregular troops who blend into the civilian population and are difficult for armies to fight.)
- The mounting casualties and the inability of the French to defeat the Vietminh made the war very unpopular in France.
- Finally after being defeated at Dien Bien Phu the French finally decided to make peace and withdraw from Indochina.

6

## The Geneva Accords

- The Geneva Accords (peace negotiation) divided Vietnam along the 17<sup>th</sup> parallel, with Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh in control of North Vietnam and a pro-Western regime in control of the South.
- In 1956 elections were to be held to reunite the country under one government.
- The Accords also recognized Cambodia's independence.



7

## Ngo Dinh Diem

- After the Accords the French left and the U.S. became the main protector of the new government in the South, led by **Ngo Dinh Diem**. (NOH DIHN deh-EHM)
- He was pro western and fiercely anti-communist. He also offered refuge to roughly one million Catholics who migrated to escape Ho Chi Minh's rule
- Diem became president of the new Republic of Vietnam, then refused to permit the 1956 elections.
- Eisenhower approved of his actions and increased American aid to South Vietnam.



8

## Vietcong



- After the elections were denied, Ho Chi Minh and the Communists began an armed struggle to reunify the nation.
- They created a new guerrilla army of South Vietnamese Communists, which became known as the Vietcong.
- As the fighting grew President Eisenhower sent hundreds of military advisors to train South Vietnam's forces.

9

## More Help

- Despite American help the Vietcong had assassinated thousands of government officials and established control over much of the countryside.
- In response Diem looked to the U.S. for more help.



10

## Tough of Communism

- When Kennedy took office he continued to support S. Vietnam.
- Politically Kennedy needed to appear tough on communism.
- From 1961 to late 1963 the number of military personnel in S. Vietnam jumped from 2,000 to around 15,000.



11

## Corrupt Government

- Americans believed the Vietcong continued to grow because Diem's government was unpopular and corrupt.
- They urged him to create a more democratic government and to introduce reforms to help Vietnam's peasants.
- Diem introduced some limited reforms, but they had little effect.

12

## Diem's Support Drops



- Diem made himself even more unpopular by discriminating against Buddhism, one of the countries largest religions.
- He banned the traditional religious flags for Buddha's birthday.
- Buddhists took to the streets in protest, Diem's police killed 9 people and injured 14 others.

13

## Powerful Demonstrations

- In the demonstrations that followed, a Buddhist monk set himself on fire, the first of several to do so.
- The images horrified Americans and proved how unpopular Diem had become.



14


## Military Coup

- In November of 1963 several Vietnamese generals, with the help of the U.S., launched a military coup and executed Diem.
- After his death S. Vietnam's government grew increasingly weak and unstable.
- The U.S. became even more deeply involved in order to prop it up.
- Three weeks after Diem was executed Kennedy was assassinated, leaving Lyndon Johnson with the problems in Vietnam.



15

## Johnson and Vietnam



- At first Johnson acted cautiously, but he was also determined not to let Vietnam fall to communism.
- Politics also played a role, he knew Republicans blamed the Truman administration for the fall of China to communism.
- Should the Democrats also "lose" Vietnam, Johnson feared, it might cause a "mean and destructive debate that would shatter my Presidency, kill my administration, and damage our democracy.

16

## Gulf of Tonkin

- In August of 1964 President Johnson announced that N. Vietnamese torpedo boats had fired on two American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.
- Two days later a similar attack happened.
- He insisted the attacks were unprovoked and immediately ordered aircrafts to attack the N. Vietnamese naval facilities.
- Johnson did not reveal that the American warships had been helping the S. Vietnamese spy on the North.



17

## Tonkin Resolution



- Johnson then got Congress approval to defend American forces and American allies in Southeast Asia.
- On August 7, 1964, congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing the president to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression.
- Basically congress had handed the war over to congress.

18

## America Approves

- Shortly after the Vietcong began attacking American bases.
- After one attack on a base at Pleiku left 8 Americans dead and 100 wounded Johnson decided to respond.
- Less than 14 hours after the attack, American aircraft bombed N. Vietnam



19

## Approval Ratings ↑



- After the attack, Johnson's approval ratings jumped from 41% to 60%
- Nearly 80% of Americans agreed that without American intervention Vietnam would fall to communism and that the U.S. should send troops in to prevent that from happening

20

## Send in the Troops



- In March of 1967, President Johnson expanded American involvement by beginning a sustained bombing campaign against N. Vietnam code-named Operation Rolling Thunder.
- The same month, the president ordered the first combat troops into Vietnam.
- American soldiers would now fight alongside South Vietnamese troops against the Vietcong.

21

## Vietcong

- By 1966 there were close to 400,000 American troops in Vietnam.
- Lacking the firepower of the Americans the Vietcong used ambushes, booby traps, and other guerrilla tactics.
- The Vietcong troops frustrated American troops by blending in with the general population and then quickly vanishing.



22

## Search and Destroy




- To counter the Vietcong's tactics, American troops went on "search and destroy" missions.
- The Vietcong evaded American forces by hiding out in the thick jungle or escaping through tunnels.
- To take away their ability to hide American troops literally destroyed the landscape.

23


## Agent Orange

- American planes dropped napalm, a jellied gasoline that explodes on contact.
- They also used Agent Orange, a chemical that strips leaves from trees and shrubs, turning farmland and forest into wasteland.
- The U.S. hoped these tactics would force the Vietcong to surrender but it became clear they were willing to accept huge losses to achieve their goals.



24

## Ho Chi Minh Trail



- The Vietcong was made up of many S. Vietnamese, but they were supported by the North.
- As Vietcong casualties mounted, North Vietnam began sending soldiers to fight.
- Supplies were sent through a network of jungle paths known as the **Ho Chi Minh Trail**.

25

## The Trail

- The trail wound through the countries of Cambodia and Laos, bypassing the border between North and South Vietnam.
- Because the trail ran through countries that were not involved in the war President Johnson refused to allow a full-scale attack on the trail to shut it down.



26

## War of attrition

- North Vietnam received supplied and aid from the Soviet Union and China.
- This prevented Johnson from ordering a full-scale attack, but it also made it difficult to win.
- Instead of conquering enemy territory, American troops were forced to fight a **war of attrition**.
- This strategy led troops to conduct grisly body counts after battle to determine how many soldiers had been killed.
- The U.S. began measuring "progress" in the war by the number of enemy dead.



27

## Support Falls



- Bombing from American planes killed as many as 220,000 Vietnamese between 1965 and 1967.
- By the end of 1966, more than 6,700 soldiers had been killed.
- The notion of a quick and decisive victory grew increasingly remote.
- As a result, many citizens back home began to question the nations involvement.

28

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[Photograph](#) taken from *USS Maddox* (DD-731) during her engagement with three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin, 2 August 1964.




[Oil on canvas](#) by Commander E.J. Fitzgerald, January 1965. It depicts the engagement between *USS Maddox* (DD-731) and three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats on 2 August 1964.

## Essay: 40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident

by **John Prados**

Posted August 4, 2004



**Order this book**

On this 40th anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf incident it is appropriate to recall an affair that has much history wound around it, a watershed in the U.S. move toward full-scale war in Vietnam. At the time, in August 1964, the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson used the incident as a pretext to seek from Congress a joint resolution approving the use of force in Southeast Asia, which it then relied upon as legal justification for all-out war. The episode opened the way for an American military commitment that ultimately peaked in March 1969 with 548,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam plus additional supporting forces in Thailand. Some 59,000 Americans and several million Vietnamese died in the conflict.

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More recently, the Tonkin Gulf incident has regularly been invoked in connection with the lead-up to the war in Iraq, where the administration of President George W. Bush also cited threats to the United States to obtain congressional approval for the use of force. Those claims, too, proved to be based largely on seriously flawed intelligence and possibly, according to some critics, manipulated. The parallels to Tonkin make it all the more worthwhile to re-examine the events of 40 years ago on the basis of newly acquired evidence.

## Background

The particulars of the incidents of early August 1964, as reported by the Johnson administration, were crucial to gaining the legislative authority President Johnson sought, which came in the form of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. At the time and for some years afterward, the United States government took the position that it had done nothing to provoke a naval engagement in the Tonkin Gulf between North Vietnamese and U.S. warships. The Johnson administration also maintained that it had acted with restraint, refusing to respond to an initial North Vietnamese attack on August 2, 1964, and reacting only after North Vietnam made a second naval attack two nights later. Both of these assertions turned out to be misleading.

In fact the United States at the time was carrying out a program of covert naval commando attacks against North Vietnam and had been engaged in this effort since its approval by Johnson in January 1964. (For documentation of this program, carried out under Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34-A, see the Tonkin Gulf subset of the National Security Archive's microfiche collection, *U.S. Policy in the Vietnam War, I: 1954-1968*.) A fresh addition to the declassified record is the intelligence estimate included in this briefing book, Special National Intelligence Estimate 50-2-64. Published in May 1964, the estimate again demonstrates that the United States purposefully directed OPLAN 34-A to pressure North Vietnam, to the extent of attempting to anticipate Hanoi's reaction. It wrongly concluded that North Vietnam, while taking precautionary measures, "might reduce the level of the insurrections for the moment." ([Note 1](#)) In fact Hanoi decided instead to commit its regular army forces to the fighting in South Vietnam.

The Johnson administration's characterization of the specifics of the Tonkin Gulf incident has proven to be inaccurate. Administration officials contended that the U.S. warship simply happened to be cruising in the Gulf to exert a U.S. presence -- engaged in "innocent passage" under international law. The naval battle between the destroyer *USS Maddox* and several North Vietnamese torpedo boats occurred on August 2, 1964, in the immediate aftermath of a series of 34-A maritime raids on North Vietnamese coastal targets. Among the targets were two offshore islands, Hon Me and Hon Ngu, which

were closely approached by the *Maddox* prior to the August 2 engagement. The American destroyer was in international waters when the battle itself took place but the North Vietnamese made the logical connection that the 34-A raids and the destroyer's appearance were related. In fact the mission of the *Maddox* was specifically to record North Vietnamese radar and other electronic emissions which could be expected to spike after a 34-A raid.

Senior administration officials were well aware of the connection between the 34-A raids and the destroyer's intelligence cruise, called a "DeSoto Patrol." Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, in his very first telephone conversation with President Johnson about the battle, at 10:30 a.m. Washington time on August 3, raised the issue. LBJ wanted McNamara to hold a private briefing for congressional leaders on Capitol Hill. McNamara replied, "I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this OPLAN 34-A. There's no question but what that had bearing on." ([Note 2](#)) McNamara went on to describe the 34-A mission, including mention of the two islands, the number of attack boats participating, their ammunition expenditures, and other details.

Appearing before the legislators, Secretary McNamara did mention the 34-A raids but asserted they were *South Vietnamese* naval missions and had nothing to do with the United States. In fact the 34-A missions were unilaterally controlled by the U.S., using boats procured and maintained by the U.S. Navy, attacking targets selected by the CIA, in an operation paid for by the United States. The only South Vietnamese aspect of 34-A was the administrative responsibility borne by that government's special forces for their nationals recruited as the commandos for the missions, commandos who were nevertheless led by Americans. Some accounts by Americans who participated in such missions actually maintain that Americans were present aboard the attack boats during the raids of August 2. ([Note 3](#))

Secretary McNamara not only advanced the fiction of 34-A as a South Vietnamese enterprise in a private meeting with congressmen, he repeated it at congressional hearings on the administration's requested use of force resolution. At an executive session hearing held on August 6, McNamara declared, "Our Navy played absolutely no part in, was not associated with, was not aware of, any South Vietnamese actions, if there were any." ([Note 4](#)) Controversy over Johnson administration claims regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident began not long after the events themselves and grew over time, leading to an unusual review of the events in a new set of hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1968. Secretary McNamara again served as the administration's lead witness and claimed that the issue of provocation had been "fully explored" at the 1964 hearings.

Specifically, McNamara declared that Congress had investigated whether the attacks "were in any way provoked by or related to certain South Vietnamese naval activity." McNamara later reasserted that the 34-A missions were "countermeasures being taken by the South Vietnamese in response to North Vietnamese aggression." (Note 5) These administration assertions were highly misleading as the declassified documentary record of OPLAN 34-A makes abundantly clear.

The leading edge of doubt which ultimately forced the February 1968 review of the Gulf of Tonkin incident arose over whether a second attack on U.S. warships had occurred on the night of August 4. Following the initial naval battle of August 2, President Johnson ordered a second U.S. destroyer, the *USS C. Turner Joy*, to join the *Maddox*, after which both ships sailed back up the Gulf of Tonkin. On the night of August 4, both ships thought they had come under attack again and sent messages reporting enemy contacts, torpedoes in the water, and so on, while directing a good deal of fire at the supposed adversary. Following this supposed repeat challenge to "innocent passage," President Johnson ordered retaliatory bombing against North Vietnam and asked for the congressional resolution with which he prosecuted the Vietnam war.

But the certainty of the "second attack" would never be so clear as the first. The initial battle took place in daylight. There were photographs of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats engaged in a fire-fight with the *Maddox*, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer retained a dud shell from one of the Vietnamese vessels as a souvenir, and numerous *Maddox* sailors confirmed sighting at least three torpedoes. However, there was no physical evidence at all for the August 4 attack claims. The supposed surface action took place at night and in poor weather. The skipper and four seamen aboard the *C. Turner Joy* variously claimed having seen a searchlight, boat cockpit lights, smoke at a location where they claimed their gunfire had hit a Vietnamese vessel in the water, and one, or perhaps two, torpedo wakes. The Navy further claimed their vessels had sunk two attacking torpedo boats. But there was no wreckage, nor bodies of dead sailors. No photographs or other physical evidence existed. Radar and sonar sightings provided an exceedingly confusing set of data at best. (Note 6)

American pilots from the carrier *USS Ticonderoga* sent to help defend the destroyers from their supposed attackers told the same story. Commander James B. Stockdale, who led this flight of jets, spotted no enemy, and at one point saw the *Turner Joy* pointing her guns at the *Maddox*. As Stockdale, who retired an admiral after a distinguished career that included being shot down and imprisoned by the North Vietnamese, later wrote: "There was absolutely no gunfire except our own, no PT boat wakes, not a candle light let

alone a burning ship. None could have been there and not have been seen on such a black night." ([Note 7](#)) In his memoir, Stockdale also remarked on the situation: "I had the best seat in the house from which to detect boats-if there were any. I didn't have to look through surface haze and spray like the destroyers did, and yet I could see the destroyers' every move vividly." ([Note 8](#)) These comments reinforce the dispatches from the Navy's on-scene commander, Captain John Herrick, who after filing various reports of attacks sent a cable that questioned them all. A Top Secret August 28, 1964 chronology prepared for President Johnson summarized Herrick's report, sent at 1:27 p.m. Washington time on August 4, as follows: "a review of the action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired 'appear doubtful'. 'Freak weather effects' on radar, and 'over-eager' sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. 'No visual sightings' have been reported by the *Maddox*, and the Commander suggests that a 'complete evaluation' be undertaken before any further action." But Washington had already decided to strike North Vietnam.

Stockdale's commentaries came after America's Vietnam war had ended, but questions regarding the "second attack" were already strong enough by 1968 to force renewed congressional attention. Secretary McNamara pulled out a trump card during the 1968 hearings to silence doubters. The trump was a set of communications intercepts made by the Naval Security Group detachment on the destroyer *Maddox*, the very unit whose presence defined this cruise as a DeSoto Patrol. As McNamara described the intercepts in his testimony: "Intelligence reports from a highly classified and unimpeachable source reported that North Vietnam was making preparations to attack our destroyers with two Swatow [patrol] boats and one PT boat if the PT could be made ready in time. The same source reported, while the engagement was in progress on August 4, that the attack was underway. Immediately after the attack ended, the source reported that the North Vietnamese lost two ships in the engagement." ([Note 9](#))

Secretary McNamara played the intercepts very close to his chest. Describing them only in general terms, he refused to leave copies with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Staff member J. Norvill Jones later recalled that McNamara cited the staff's lack of proper clearances as a reason, but also notes that McNamara's Pentagon had stalled the Committee's investigation of Tonkin Gulf since 1965, and had furnished some requested documents only after the intercession of Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, the powerful chairman of the Armed Services Committee and a close friend of Lyndon Johnson's. Years later, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright was finally able to arrange with the Nixon administration for Jones and staff director Carl Marcy to actually view the intercepts. Jones' reaction is important to record:

Of the several messages we were allowed to scan, only one was from August 4. The others clearly related to the incident on August 2.

My reading of the Aug. 4 intercept was that it was a boastful summary of the attack on August 2. Even the NSA [National Security Agency] officials could not say that it definitely related to the Aug. 4 action. In addition the time sequence of the intercept and the reported action from the U.S. destroyers did not jibe. Curiously, NSA could not find the original of the Aug. 4 intercept, although it did have originals of the others. ([Note 10](#))

A 1980s investigation of these events by reporters for *U.S. News and World Report* found intelligence officers who agreed with Jones' reading of the Tonkin Gulf intercepts. They quoted Ray S. Cline, who at the time headed the CIA's Intelligence Directorate and would later become chief of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research: "I began to see that the [intercepts] which were being received at the time of the second attack almost certainly could not have referred to the second attack because of the time differences involved. Things were being referred to which, although they might have been taking place at that time, could not have been reported back so quickly." ([Note 11](#)) Also suspect was the fact that intercepts from August 2 had been recorded widely by NSA stations as well as the *Maddox* while those of the 4th reportedly were recorded only by a listening post at Phu Bai in South Vietnam. Louis Tordella, long-serving deputy director of the National Security Agency, was among those intelligence officers who discount the validity of the August 4 intercepts.

### **New Evidence**

Now, forty years later, Americans for the first time have the opportunity to make up their own minds on the Tonkin Gulf intercepts. After repeated requests using the Mandatory Declassification Review process, this analyst was able to get them declassified in March 2003.

The cables included here *are* the relevant NSA intercepts. In the immediate aftermath of the "crisis," the White House *asked* for the intercepted radio traffic and it was sent over. A cover note for National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy on August 8 reads: "Last night the White House Situation Room relayed a request from Mr. Bundy for all intercepts which preceded and related to the second attack on the *Maddox* and *Turner Joy*. The attached messages were selected by CIA and NSA." ([Note 12](#)) The note covered a list that contained the exact items reproduced here,

including the five (out of eight) which have been declassified as of this writing.

A review of the documents will make clear that the cables were *not* raw intercepts of North Vietnamese radio traffic but rather *reports* from the intercepting units on the *Maddox* and elsewhere which *summarize* the contents of the raw intercepts. This point is important because it means that the infamous intercepts *could not have been simultaneously passed along* to the Hawaii headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific or to Washington. Radio intelligence units had to perform *three* activities before the information could be passed up the chain of command: the intercepts themselves had to be recorded, the North Vietnamese communications had to be decoded and translated, and a message had to be assembled using the new information. Of course, those messages themselves had then to be coded and encrypted in U.S. systems before being transmitted on American radio nets. All this is crucial to bear in mind because claims as to the unimpeachability of the intelligence advanced by the Johnson administration turn on comparisons of the time these messages were sent versus the times that Captain Herrick and his destroyers reported various actions supposedly taking place in the Tonkin Gulf.

Since time is literally of the essence here, the reader should understand how to interpret the times printed on these messages. All United States military traffic is sent using "Zulu" time, or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), and each message contains a "date/time group" that identifies the time of transmission. Messages are frequently referred to by their date/time groups in official commentaries and in references in subsequent message traffic. A date/time group is composed first of two numbers identifying a day, then of four numbers that show the hour and minute (using a twenty-four hour clock). Sometimes messages also list the month and the year, the latter indicated by two final numbers. Thus "03/1211Z Aug" refers to 12:11 p.m. GMT on August 3, 1964. Local time in the Tonkin Gulf is seven hours ahead of GMT, and twelve hours ahead of Washington, DC. The date/time above therefore equates to 7:11 p.m. on August 3 in the Tonkin Gulf, and 7:11 a.m. on August 3 in Washington. Keep these time differences in mind when examining the message traffic below.

Not mentioned thus far in regard to possible U.S. provocation is the fact that 34-A forces carried out *another* raid on North Vietnam during the night of August 3/4, when the U.S. destroyers were beginning their run back up the Tonkin Gulf. If Hanoi was responding to the first raid, a second one furnished an equivalent reason to act against the reinforced DeSoto Patrol. Yet, it appears Hanoi decided not to act. North Vietnamese officials, including Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap, explained at a

retrospective international conference in 1997 that their August 2 response had been ordered by a local naval command, not the Hanoi leadership. (Note 13) The Vietnamese said they had mounted no naval sortie on the 4th. This is consistent. Concerned at the severity of the U.S. reaction to the August 2 engagement, the Hanoi leadership could very well have made sure not to mount a subsequent operation, *even in the face of a second 34-A coastal raid*.

Congressional staffer Jones and others are quite right to observe that a number of the intercepts describe the naval action of August 2. In that battle there *were* shootouts between North Vietnamese torpedo boats and U.S. aircraft, and two of the North Vietnamese boats were sunk, as described in one of the messages. Another message describes a sighting of "two enemy assault vessels" east of the island of Hon Me. The time of day reported in the message, 8:28 p.m. local (message 03/1328Z), actually corresponds very closely to the time, 9:35 p.m., when the *Maddox* had been in this position on August 1, prior to the initial naval engagement. That time is recorded on track charts of the *Maddox's* position in the official U.S. Navy history for this period of the Vietnam war. (Note 14) The two destroyers traveling together were near Hon Me only in mid-afternoon of August 4. Hon Me had been one of the targets of the initial 34-A maritime operation, which had hit at half past midnight, July 31 -- a rather close connection. The North Vietnamese message had included orders to naval officers to shadow the Americans.

The next message in the series (04/1140Z) reports a preparatory order to two North Vietnamese patrol boats to prepare for operations and informs them that a torpedo boat, the T-333, may join them if it can be made ready in time. Three minutes later there was a sighting report for a U.S. destroyer. This sounds like possible support for the hypothesis that the North Vietnamese fought Americans again on August 4, but only until the American side is also examined. Captain Herrick's destroyers first reported radar sightings in a message with the date/time group 04/1240Z. The base for the North Vietnamese Swatow patrol vessels referenced in these messages was at Quang Khe, near Dong Hoi, roughly 110 nautical miles from Hon Me. Not even a well-maintained and fully fuelled Swatow able to sustain its maximum speed of over 40 knots could cover that distance from Quang Khe in the time interval between the intercepts and the U.S. message.

Meanwhile, in Washington, at 9:43 a.m. on August 4, Secretary McNamara had another conversation with President Johnson. Their discussion reflects McNamara's knowledge of the intercepts where he says, referring to the U.S. destroyer (McNamara uses the singular), "this ship is allegedly, uh, to be attacked tonight." (Note 15) McNamara and the president went on to discuss what retaliation

they could carry out for the attack (that had not happened), including bombing targets in North Vietnam or undertaking more 34-A maritime assaults. An hour later, when McNamara called in the first report that the alleged attack had begun, he was already prepared with a list of options.

Much of the supposed action of August 4 occurred between the U.S. message just mentioned and another from Captain Herrick at 04/1602Z, in which the destroyers reported having evaded torpedoes and to having "sunk" at least one attacking surface craft. It was during this time that the wild melee of radar and sonar observations and heavy gunfire occurred, and that Commander Stockdale's aircraft saw nothing. The next of the NSA intercepts is recorded at 04/1630Z. It summarized the North Vietnamese reporting about having shot at aircraft and observing one fall into the sea, with "an enemy vessel perhaps wounded." An amplification message followed at 04/1644Z admitting "we sacrificed two comrades," and specifying they had fired at two aircraft. That matched the events of August 2, when there had been exchanges between the Vietnamese torpedo boats and U.S. planes, and when the *Maddox* had been hit by at least some small-caliber cannon shells from the North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The reports did *not* match the facts of August 4, when no boats had passed beneath the U.S. planes to shoot at them. The history of U.S. destroyers carried on the Navy's official website no longer contains any reference to a naval engagement having occurred on August 4.

The last two messages in this set (05/0438Z, 05/0627Z) show the North Vietnamese Swatow boats to have regrouped *at Hon Me* island with a couple of torpedo boats and to have received orders for some action to be carried out in the northern Gulf of Tonkin in the afternoon of August 5. By that time Captain Herrick's DeSoto Patrol had cleared the Gulf and was no longer a factor.

An equally plausible construction of the events pictured in these intercepts is that the North Vietnamese, in the face of the 34-A maritime raids and sudden appearance of a heavy U.S. warship, ordered their Swatow patrol boats to rendezvous at Hon Me with surviving torpedo boats in preparation for defensive action against the U.S. destroyers, by then gone. It is not probable that the North Vietnamese, who knew from official U.S. statements that Captain Herrick had been reinforced, would have sent their Swatow boats, with no armament capable of sinking a destroyer (machineguns and light cannon only, no torpedoes), against the strengthened U.S. destroyer force. The intercepts themselves confirm that the torpedo boat T-333, the only survivor of the August 2 battle, was not ready to sail at the critical moment on August 4, when Hanoi could have set up a battle for that day.

Among the most prophetic and disturbing statements in the declassified record are those by national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, at the White House staff meeting at 8 a.m. on August 5, 1964. Bundy told the staff, according to the memorandum for the record drafted by military aide William Y. Smith: "On the first attack, the evidence would be pretty good. On the second one the amount of evidence we have today is less than we had yesterday. This resulted primarily from correlating bits and pieces of information eliminating double counting and mistaken signals. This much seemed certain: There was an attack. How many PT boats were involved, how many torpedoes were fired, etc. - all this was still somewhat uncertain. This matter may be of some importance since Hanoi has denied making the second attack." We now know this denial was accurate and Washington's claims were not, and that senior officials knew of the "double counting and mistaken signals." But when new staffer Douglass Cater - attending his first morning meeting on August 5, 1964 - questioned the need for a Congressional resolution, "Bundy, in reply, jokingly told him perhaps the matter should not be thought through too far. For his own part, he welcomed the recent events as justification for a resolution the Administration had wanted for some time."

Change a few of the words in these quotes - perhaps substitute "weapons of mass destruction" for "PT boats" and "torpedoes," and "Baghdad" for "Hanoi" - and the parallels with today become all too apt.

This new evidence permits us to view more accurately the internal deliberations of the Johnson administration. Especially in combination with LBJ's telephone conversations with McNamara, recently made available to the public with transcriptions, the material clearly shows Washington rushing to a judgment on events in the Tonkin Gulf, which it seized upon as evidence in support of its predetermined intention to escalate the conflict in Vietnam. Those who questioned the veracity of the Johnson administration's description of the Gulf of Tonkin incident at the time were right to do so. The manipulation of this international situation for the administration's political purpose of obtaining a congressional authorization for the use of force bears considerable similarity to the manner in which the Bush administration manipulated intelligence regarding the possibility that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction to gain its own legislative approval for war against that country. ([Note 16](#)) In both cases, truth became the first casualty. In both cases, the consequences far outweighed anything anticipated by the presidents involved.

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### Notes

1. CIA, SNIE 50-2-64, "Probable Consequences of Certain US Actions with Respect to Vietnam and Laos," May 25, 1964 (declassified June 8, 2004). Source: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL): Lyndon Baines Johnson Papers (LBJP): National Security File: Country File Vietnam, b. 89, folder: "Vietnam 3S: CIA Assesses Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions, 5/64-1/68."
2. Johnson-McNamara Telephone conversation, 10:30 AM, August 3, 1964, in John Prados, ed. *The White House Tapes*. New York: The New Press, 2003, p. 185.
3. Michael Lee Lanning and Ray W. Stubbe. *Inside Force Recon: Recon Marines in Vietnam*. New York: Ballantine, 1989.
4. U.S. Congress (88th Congress, 2nd Session) Foreign Relations Committee. *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Historical Series, v. XVI*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 293.
5. McNamara Opening Statement, February 20, 1968. Reprinted, *The New York Times*, February 21, 1968, p. 21.
6. The best survey of the data is in Edwin E. Moise. *The Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Also see Anthony Austin, *The President's War: The Story of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and How the Nation was Trapped in Vietnam*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971; and Eugene C Windchy, *Tonkin Gulf*. Garden City (NY): Doubleday, 1971.
7. Admiral James B. Stockdale, "Another Gulf, Other Blips on a Screen," *The Washington Post*, August 7, 1988, p. B7.
8. James B. Stockdale, *In Love and War*. New York: Bantam Books, 1985, p. 17.
9. McNamara Testimony Excerpts Gathered for President Johnson, February 20, 1968. LBJL: LBJP: National Security File (NSF): NSC Histories series, box 39, folder: "Gulf of Tonkin, v. III (Tabs 23-31)."
10. J. Norvill Jones, Letter to the Editor, *Washington Post*, November 23, 1995, p. A22.
11. "The Phantom Battle that Led to War: Can It Happen Again?" *U.S. News and World Report*, July 23, 1984, quoted p. 63.
12. CIA Cover Note, August 8, 1964. LBJL "LBJP:NSF: Country File Vietnam, box 77, Folder: "Vietnam 3(A)3 Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64 [3 of 3]."

13. The author was a member of the U.S. delegation to the conference, and personally witnessed General Giap make this statement to Robert McNamara. The conference, "Missed Opportunities? Former U.S. and Vietnamese Reexamine the Vietnam War, 1961-1968," was held in Hanoi, June 20-23, 1997. It was sponsored by Brown University's Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies and the Institute for International Relations (Hanoi). The National Security Archive provided the documentary base, along with other support, for the conference.

14. Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, *The United States Navy in the Vietnam Conflict, II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965*. Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1986, map p. 412.

15. Telephone Conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson-Robert S. McNamara, August 4, 1964, 9:43 AM. Prados, ed. *The White House Tapes*, p. 193.

16. Readers interested in a detailed treatment of the Bush administration and Iraq may refer to John Prados, *Hoodwinked: The Documents that Reveal How Bush sold Us a War*. New York: The New Press, 2004.

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
# 4L Latin Distance Learning

— Week of May 15-21 —

Directions:

- *Carefully* read through our new Ch. 38 grammar notes! There's a lot here, so be sure to take your time.
- On the page labelled "Latin Exercises", write your name and class (hour) in the top right, and translate #1-5 to turn in. For optional/ enrichment, *transform* each sentence, and then re-translate!

As always, please reach out to me with any questions you have (including the "enrichment" work)!



← WHO SAYS  
LATIN CAN'T  
BE PUNNY?

# Chapter 38 Grammar Notes I

## Relative Clauses of Characteristic

Review Rel. Clauses: When an **indicative** is used in a relative clause, it provides some **factual description** of the antecedent.

haec est discipula **quae** Latīnam amat.

*This is the student **who** loves Latin.*

Definition: When the relative clause describes some **general quality** of an antecedent that is itself general, indefinite, interrogative, or negative, the verb will be **subjunctive**.

haec est discipula **quae** Latinam amet.

*This is a student (the sort of student) **who** would love Latin.*

Recognition: a **relative pronoun** with a **sbjn.** verb and a general, negative, etc. antecedent:

sunt quī...                      *there are people/those who...*

quis est quī...                *who is there who...*

nēmō est quī...              *there is no one who...*

Translation: “*would*” is sometimes used for the subjunctive; also can be translated as an indic.; in addition, a phrase like “*the sort of*” or “*the kind of*” is used in the **main clause**

### Examples:

quis est **quī** huic **crēdat**?

*Who is there **who** trusts this man?*

*Who is of such a sort **that he would trust** this man?*

nēmō erat **quī** hoc **scīret**.

*There was no one **who** knew this.*

sunt **quī** hoc **faciant**.

*There are some **who do** this.*

*They are of such a sort **as to do** this.*

is nōn est **quī** hoc **faciat**.

*He is not a person **who does (would do)** this.*

hic est liber **quem** omnēs **legant**.

*This is the kind of book **that all read** (a book **that all would read**).*

Compare the above sentence to the one below:

hic est liber quem omnēs legunt.

*This is the book that all are reading (= a fact).*

## BONUS GRAMMAR

### Relative Clauses of Purpose

- Purpose clauses may be introduced by a relative pronoun when the antecedent, usually not the subject of the main verb, is expressed in the main clause.

nuntium mittit **quī** (ut is) dē mōribus incolārum **roget**.

*He sends a messenger **who may ask** about the customs of the inhabitants.*

*He sends a messenger **to ask** about the customs of the inhabitants.*

scrībēbat librōs **quōs** (ut eōs) aliī **legerent**.

*He wrote books **which** others **might read**.*

*He wrote books **so that** others **might read** them.*

- **quō** introduces a purpose clause that contains a comparative.

properātis **quō** (ut eō) celerius **adveniātis**.

*You hurry **by which** you may arrive more quickly.*

*You hasten **in order that** you may arrive/to arrive more quickly.*

- Purpose clauses may also be introduced by adverbs.

domum cucurrī **ubi** (ut ibi) mē **cēlārem**.

*I ran home **where** I might hide.*

*I ran home **so that** I might hide there.*

### Relative Clauses of Result


- There is a blending of a Relative Clause of Characteristic and a Result Clause.

nihil est tam malum **quod** (ut id) mūtārī nōn **possit**.

*There is nothing so bad **that** it **cannot** be changed.*

nēmō est tam caecus **quī** (ut is) haec nōn **videat**.

*No one is so blind **that** he **does not see** these things.*



## Beethoven's Musical Revolution

Last week we discussed three composers of the Classical era (1750-1828). Of these, Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827) had the greatest influence on how later composers, performers, and audiences thought about music's power to express profound feelings and ideas.

For Beethoven, music was more than just beautiful, well-ordered sounds. His own compositions often trace a dramatic and turbulent journey from struggle and self-doubt to restored confidence and triumphant affirmation of life.

Beethoven's personal struggle was very real. In the 1790s, he became very depressed about his increasing deafness. His loss of hearing worsened to the point that he had to give up playing the piano in public, and he became more and more isolated from society. His late music became very difficult for audiences to understand, but he was still considered the greatest composer of his time. By continuing to compose music, Beethoven was able to overcome his pessimistic feelings and keep going. The path from depression to renewed hope and optimism is an important idea in Beethoven's life and music.

Beethoven was also greatly invested in the social and political messages of the French Revolution, particularly its struggle toward social equality and freedom for all people. These revolutionary ideas were threatening the existing social order in Beethoven's home of Vienna, where the emperor used spies and censors to suppress them. Part of Beethoven's success was due to his use of instrumental music to convey these ideas. His music was not banned because there were no words in it to "prove" that he was encouraging resistance to oppression or demanding bold changes to society.



*French Revolution slogan: "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, or Death"*

Especially in his nine symphonies, Beethoven “translates” his personal journey and revolutionary beliefs into a universal message of perseverance and unity among people. While there are moments of incredible beauty in his music, Beethoven’s expanded musical vocabulary allows him to also express resistance, discontent, and almost violent aggression. The epic scale of Beethoven’s musical journeys are matched by this wide range of expression.

Listen to the beginning of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. The opening rhythm (short-short-short-long) has a defiant quality that has been described as Beethoven shaking his clenched fist at the world. This same music would become a symbol of international resistance to Nazism during World War II. Now listen to the opening of the fourth, final movement of Beethoven’s Fifth, and you will hear the complete change of mood: this is a jubilant brass fanfare, and is widely considered to be a musical message that triumph over hardships is possible. But these are just two key moments in the journey – listen to the whole symphony to hear how this transformation takes place.

Listening: Beethoven Symphony No. 5. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=agtMrVRr34s>

In the last movement of his Ninth Symphony, the “Choral Symphony,” Beethoven does use a text, from Schiller’s “Ode to Joy,” to reinforce the idea of moving toward the equal status and participation of all people. Opening with clashing sounds and confused fragments of other melodies, the very simple Ode to Joy melody shows us the possibility of “more joyous sounds.” Again Beethoven follows a path of transformation and development in this movement, mirroring how we as human beings can improve ourselves through education and meaningful experiences. In 1989, the European Union chose the “Ode to Joy” as its musical hymn.

The “Ode to Joy” also expresses a hope for improved relations among people through tolerance and compassion. This vision of real and lasting “justice for all” resonated with the distinguished American Civil Rights leader, Martin Luther King, Jr. King even refers to the words of the “Ode to Joy” in his famous “I Have a Dream” speech of 1963.

From the “Ode to Joy” (by Friedrich Schiller and Ludwig van Beethoven):

Oh friends, not these tones!  
Rather let us sing more  
Cheerful and more joyful ones.  
Joy! Joy!  
Your sweet magic frees all others...  
All men on earth become brothers.

From the “I Have a Dream” speech by Martin Luther King, Jr., August 28, 1963:

We will be able to transform the  
jangling discords of our nation  
into a beautiful symphony of  
brotherhood.



Listening: Beethoven Ninth Symphony (Ode to Joy movement starts at 52:14; Ode to Joy melody first heard at 55:26; vocal section starts at 59:22).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOjHhS5MtvA>

## For Further Exploration

More on Beethoven’s life and music:

<https://www.gramophone.co.uk/composers/ludwig-van-beethoven-33808>

Can you listen without being able to hear? This famous musician says you can:

[https://www.ted.com/talks/evelyn\\_glennie\\_how\\_to\\_truly\\_listen](https://www.ted.com/talks/evelyn_glennie_how_to_truly_listen)

This week we will begin a unit on natural selection. You will read a short section and then complete the worksheets. It is so nice to look over your work and see the effort you are putting in. Keep up the hard work!

**Natural selection** occurs only if there is both (1) variation in the genetic information between organisms in the population and (2) variation in the expression of that genetic information – that is, trait variation – that leads to differences in performance among individuals. The traits that positively affect survival are more likely to be reproduced, and thus are more common in the population.

**Adaptation.** "Natural selection leads to adaptation, that is, to a population dominated by organisms that are anatomically, behaviorally, and physiologically well suited to survive and reproduce in a specific environment. That is, the differential survival and reproduction of organisms in a population that have an advantageous heritable trait leads to an increase in the proportion of individuals in future generations that have the trait and to a decrease in the proportion of individuals that do not. Adaptation also means that the distribution of traits in a population can change when conditions change."

### Specific Learning Goals

- **Fitness** is the ability to survive and reproduce.
- A characteristic which is influenced by genes and can be inherited by a parent's offspring is called a **heritable trait**.
- A heritable trait that increases fitness is an **adaptation**.
- An adaptation tends to become more common in a population. Because the adaptation increases fitness, individuals with this trait generally produce more offspring. Because the trait is heritable, offspring generally have the same trait as their parents. Therefore, the adaptation tends to become more common in the population. This process is called **natural selection**.
- Another way to describe the process of natural selection is as follows. Since (1) individuals with an adaptation are more likely to survive and reproduce and (2) parents pass their alleles to their offspring, the allele(s) that result in an adaptation tend to become common in the population.
- Natural selection results in changes in the frequency in a population of an adaptation and the allele(s) that result in the adaptation. Natural selection does *not* cause changes in an individual.
- Evolution by natural selection only occurs if there is variation in a heritable trait which contributes to differences in fitness.
- Which characteristics are adaptations depends on which type of environment the population is in. The same population will evolve differently in different environments.
- If an environmental condition changes, an adaptation that increases fitness in the new environment will become more common in the population. If the change in the environmental condition is reversed, the effects of natural selection will be reversed, and the characteristic will become less common in the population.
- In biological populations, evolution by natural selection usually occurs slowly over multiple generations.

**Common misconceptions** about evolution<sup>1</sup>:

- Individual organisms can evolve during a single lifespan.
- Natural selection involves organisms trying to adapt.
- The "needs" of organisms account for the changes in populations over time (goal-directed or teleological interpretation).
- The fittest organisms in a population are those that are strongest, fastest, and/or largest.

<sup>1</sup> by Drs. Ingrid Waldron and Jennifer Doherty, Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, © 2018.

4L INSTRUCTIONS

The preterite of -er and -ir verbs

Regular -er and -ir verbs are similar to one another in the preterite. Here are the preterite forms of *aprender* and *salir*. Notice the accent marks on the endings -í and -ió:

DAY 3

**¿Recuerdas?**

You have already learned to talk about completed past actions using regular -ar verbs.



*Aprender = To learn*

|                       |            |                            |              |
|-----------------------|------------|----------------------------|--------------|
| (yo)                  | aprendí    | (nosotros)<br>(nosotras)   | aprendimos   |
| (tú)                  | aprendiste | (vosotros)<br>(vosotras)   | aprendisteis |
| Ud.<br>(él)<br>(ella) | aprendió   | Uds.<br>(ellos)<br>(ellas) | aprendieron  |

*Salir = To leave*

|                       |         |                            |           |
|-----------------------|---------|----------------------------|-----------|
| (yo)                  | salí    | (nosotros)<br>(nosotras)   | salimos   |
| (tú)                  | saliste | (vosotros)<br>(vosotras)   | salisteis |
| Ud.<br>(él)<br>(ella) | salíó   | Uds.<br>(ellos)<br>(ellas) | salieron  |

*To see*

The verb *ver* is regular in the preterite but does not have accent marks in any of its forms:

vi viste vio vimos visteis vieron

Gustar and similar verbs

DAY 4 & 5

Even though we usually translate the verb *gustar* as "to like," it literally means "to please." So when you say, *Me gustan los programas deportivos*, you're actually saying, "Sports programs are pleasing to me." *Programas deportivos* is the subject of the sentence, and *me* is the indirect object. Here's the pattern:

indirect object + form of *gustar* + subject

The subject in a sentence with *gustar* usually follows the verb. You need to know if the subject is singular or plural to know which form of *gustar* to use. If the subject is singular, use *gusta*. If it's plural, use *gustan*. If it's an infinitive, use *gusta*.

- Me gusta el actor en la telenovela pero no me gustan las actrices.
- A mis amigos les gusta ver películas.

To emphasize or clarify who is pleased, you can use an additional *a* + pronoun:

A mí me gustan los dibujos animados, pero a él no le gustan.

Here are the other verbs you know that are similar to *gustar*:

- aburrir* - <sup>To get bored/boring</sup> *aburrid* A mí me aburren las películas románticas.
- doler* (o → ue) <sup>To hurt</sup> A Fernando le duelen los pies.
- encantar* <sup>To love</sup> A mis padres les encanta el teatro.
- faltar* <sup>Something you are missing</sup> Me faltan un cuchillo y un tenedor.
- interesar* <sup>To be interested</sup> Nos interesan mucho los programas musicales.
- quedar* <sup>To fit well or not</sup> ¿No te queda bien el vestido?

**¿Recuerdas?**

You have used *me gusta(n)*, *te gusta(n)*, and *le gusta(n)* to talk about what a person likes.

- A mí me gusta el cine pero a mi hermano le gusta más la televisión.



Indirect Pronouns:

me nos  
te os  
le les